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11. INTRODUCTION
Theoretical industrial organization has argued, since at least Dixit (1980) and going back
to Bain (1956) and Modigliani (1958), that excess capacity can be used to deter entry into
markets.  This issue has received considerable attention in the industrial organization literature,
as one of the leading instances of the importance of commitment in sequential games.
References to and discussions of Dixit (1980) appear in virtually all the teaching manuals in the
area (see e.g. Tirole 1989, Basu 1993, Martin 1993 and Vives 1999).  Despite this, there is little
empirical evidence that incumbent firms actually hold excess capacity (see, for example, Smiley
1988 and Singh, Utton & Waterson 1998).1
Bagwell and Ramey (1996) provide a theoretical rationalization of this fact, based on a
new approach to the problem. The specific model they put forward has three principal
ingredients.  First, it involves a different sequence of moves of the incumbent and the entrant
than the one proposed by Dixit.  The other two ingredients are the existence of a partially-
recoverable capacity or entry cost and the use of forward induction to select among several
equilibria.  In their model, there are typically monopoly equilibria in which either the incumbent
or the entrant captures the market, as well as market-sharing equilibria in which both firms
produce positive output levels. Their main result is that forward induction rules out the equilibria
where the incumbent invests in capacity and, hence, manages to retain the whole market.  The
model yields a very suggestive explanation of observed behavior and invites further
investigation.  However, given the highly stylized nature of the model, and the lack of
observability of some of the key variables, a proper test of this model with field data is difficult.
We therefore conduct an experiment to study the extent to which this explanation is satisfactory
and, more generally, to shed light on the strategic behavior of incumbents and entrants.
In our experiment we use a simple game inspired by (but somewhat different from) the
one in Bagwell and Ramey (1996), hereafter B-R.  In our game, two firms – an incumbent and a
potential entrant – make decisions in three stages.  First, the incumbent has the opportunity to
partially pre-commit to a given level of capacity, by incurring a certain cost.  Then the entrant
has the same choice, having observed the incumbent’s choice.  In the third stage both firms
simultaneously decide whether to compete (in prices) in the market, by then paying (the rest of)
the capacity cost.  There are two pure-strategy equilibrium outcomes: One of the two firms
2produces and obtains monopoly profit while the other stays out of the market.  Both of these
situations are equilibrium outcomes resulting from backward induction.
However, only the outcome in which the incumbent leaves the market and the entrant
conquers it survives the application of forward induction.  In our context, an entrant who (after
having observed the incumbent’s choice) pre-commits capacity must be signaling that she
intends to become the monopolist, as pre-committing and then not producing is a dominated
strategy.  The entrant could have avoided pre-committing so as not to lose the pre-committed
cost.  In anticipation of this, the incumbent does not invest in capacity. Thus, in this game the
possibility of partial pre-commitment together with the logic of forward induction takes away the
advantage that the incumbent has in the standard entry-deterrence model.  Hence, in this model
the prediction is that, as the field data suggest, incumbents do not invest in capacity to deter
entry.
There is one specific difference between the B-R game and ours that should be
highlighted here: In our game there are no market-sharing equilibria.2  The case with market-
sharing equilibria can be considered to be the empirically more reasonable one, since what the
field evidence suggests is that incumbents cannot use capacity to keep other firms out of the
market and not so much that entrants can expel incumbents.  It therefore would seem natural to
include market-sharing equilibria in the design.  However, for evaluating the proposed selection
argument, an environment without the possibility for market-sharing is more appropriate.  The
main reason is that market-sharing involves an element of fairness and this feature could bias
data in favor of this outcome.  In addition, the exclusion of the possibility of market-sharing
eliminates potential coordination problems within the set of those equilibria that survive the
proposed selection argument.  Our simple set-up allows for a cleaner comparison between the
two types of outcomes.
We find that the full B-R prediction does not hold in our laboratory data.  In fact, the
incumbent becomes the monopolist three times as frequently as the potential entrant. An
explanation of the fact that the incumbent tends to win the market may be found in a commonly-
held belief by many players that the first mover has a strategic advantage, and thus should
become the monopolist in the post-commitment game.  In a less restrictive environment with
                                                                                                                                                                                             
1 See also Geroski (1995) for a discussion of what is known empirically about entry.
2 This also holds in the B-R game, under specific cost conditions.
3ample market-sharing possibilities this first-mover advantage might lead to incumbents capturing
a larger part of markets or capturing a given market with smaller expenditures on capacity.  At
the same time, we find that there is only limited pre-commitment by either the incumbent or the
entrant.
As a complement to our main treatment we also conducted sessions with a (more)
standard entry game à la Dixit (1980), in which only the incumbent may pre-commit.  Here we
find a considerably higher rate of incumbent entry deterrence through pre-commitment.3  The
quite moderate level of pre-commitment in our B-R design data is quite suggestive, since it is
consistent with the field evidence.  However, in which sense is it consistent with the more
frequent use of pre-commitment in the Dixit treatment?  Perhaps the world is more like the B-R
environment, involving capacity decisions by both firms and partially recoverable costs.  In
addition, behavior in the Dixit treatment may help us to understand behavior in the B-R
environment.  The pre-conception of the first-mover advantage may be the starting point in both
cases.  In Dixit the pre-commitment signal is a rather clear one and, hence, is used more
frequently; it may be perceived as the way to drive home the point of the incumbent’s first-
mover advantage.  In contrast, in B-R the meaning of the combined signals may seem open to
interpretation, and so pre-commitment is used less frequently.
More generally, when forward induction does not clash with a perception of first-mover
advantage, as in the case when only the first mover happens to pre-commit or in the game when
only one player can pre-commit, then the pre-committed player becomes the monopolist with a
very high likelihood.  In these cases, the pre-commitment signal is not indispensable but it helps,
indicating that most participants do have an understanding of the basic forward-induction force.
In fact, we find evidence that the choice of whether or not to participate in the market is strongly
dependent on the pre-installation decisions.
The perceived first mover advantage is only part of our explanation of the results. In our
game, forward induction selects the same outcome as the iterated deletion of weakly-dominated
strategies.  Therefore, even if players were boundedly rational, one might expect that the
opportunity to play the game repeatedly could lead players to avoid dominated strategies, at least
                                                           
3 Mason and Nowell (1998) report results from experiments with a related Dixit-type entry game.  Their game is less
stylized than ours, so that behavior may be affected by the complexity of the set-up.  They find that many
incumbents choose an entry-barring output and that many entrants stay out of the market.  However, a significant
4after enough time of play.  An initial perception of a first mover advantage would then vanish
over time.  It is, however, well known that learning or evolution does not always lead to limiting
outcomes that respect the iterated deletion of weakly-dominated strategies.4  We provide some
results that explain why the initial pattern of play is not driven out. We show theoretically that
our game has outcomes that do not satisfy the iterated-deletion logic, but are asymptotically
present under dynamics where better-performing strategies grow faster than worse-performing
ones.  We also perform simulations with a learning model (Camerer and Ho 1999) that tracks the
behavior of our data.
2. IMPLEMENTATION
2.1. The Game
In our game there are two firms that can produce a homogeneous good with constant, and
equal, marginal cost.  Production requires the building of a plant or some other initial
investment; the total cost of this initial investment is F.  The game has three stages: In the first
and second stages, the incumbent and the entrant make sequential and observable capacity pre-
installation decisions.  More precisely, the incumbent first chooses whether or not to
irrecoverably sink a fraction a < 1 of the fixed cost of production F .  After observing the
incumbent’s choice the entrant then chooses between the same two options.  In the third stage,
the two firms simultaneously make a decision on whether to compete in the market. This
decision involves either paying the remaining part of the full fixed cost, (1-a)F, or the whole
amount F.  Thus, if one of the firms has not pre-committed, it can still pay for the total fixed cost
F in the third stage.
The third-stage competition is in prices.  As a result, if both firms decide to actually pay
(the remainder of) the full capacity cost in the third stage, the resulting price will be equal to the
marginal cost.  If only one of them chooses to pay the whole cost, then the outcome will be the
monopoly outcome. The only relevant actions in the third stage are, hence, whether or not to pay
(the remainder of) the whole fixed cost.
                                                                                                                                                                                             
proportion of potential entrants entered when it yielded losses and a substantial proportion of incumbents did not
engage in entry deterrence.
4 See, e.g., Fudenberg and Levine (1998), Samuelson (1997), Vega-Redondo (1996).
5There are four possible pre-commitment combinations, which give rise to four possible
subgames in the third stage. Figure 1 presents these subgames for our B-R sessions using a
general payoff representation in which we have normalized monopoly profits to 1.  Earnings
from Bertrand competition in the market are zero so that if both firms enter the market they both
earn –F.  Inaction leads to zero profits.
For the incumbent, A denotes no pre-installation and B pre-installation.  For the entrant’s
reactions to A, we denote no pre-installation with C and pre-installation with D, whereas for the
reactions to B, the absence of pre-installation is denoted by E and pre-installation by F.  This
explains the names of the different subgames: AC is the subgame in which no firm pre-commits,
AD where only the entrant pre-commits, BE where only the incumbent pre-commits, and BF
where both firms pre-commit.  We denote by action I (in each subgame) the action in which a
player pays the whole investment cost in the third stage, and by NI the action in which a player
does not pay this cost.
Figure 1: Subgames in Bagwell-Ramey Sessions.
SUBGAME AC SUBGAME AD
Entrant Entrant
NI I NI I
NI 0, 0 0, 1 NI    0, -aF     0, 1
Incumbent Incumbent
I 1, 0   -F, -F I    1, -aF  -F, -F
SUBGAME BE SUBGAME BF
Entrant Entrant
NI I NI I
NI -aF, 0 0, 1 NI -aF, -aF     0, 1
Incumbent Incumbent
I 1, 0   -F, -F I    1, -aF  -F, -F
Subgame-perfect equilibria. In every subgame, the action pairs (NI, I) and (I, NI) are
the only equilibria.  Given this, there are a variety of pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria in
this game.  However, some of the outcomes are not possible under subgame-perfection with pure
6strategies. Any firm can guarantee itself zero profits by not pre-committing and then choosing NI
in all subgames; thus, no firm can obtain –aF in equilibrium. Also, since the pairs (NI, NI) and
(I, I) are not pure strategy equilibria in any subgame, the profit pairs (0, 0) and (-F, -F) cannot
occur as part of a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
But either of the two profit pairs (1,0) and (0,1) is consistent with subgame perfection.
For example, if both agents expect (NI, I) in all of the second-stage subgames, it is optimal for
the incumbent to not invest, and the entrant will be the monopolist (with or without pre-
commitment), with a profit of (0,1).  The reverse holds if (I, NI) is expected in all of the second-
stage subgames, for a final profit of (1,0).  Intuitively, if both firms believe that the incumbent
will be the winner in the second stage, this leads to an equilibrium where the incumbent is a
monopolist in the second stage and the entrant chooses to not pre-commit and stays out of the
market.  The reverse happens if the firms believe that the entrant will ‘win’ after all first-stage
outcomes.
2.2. Forward Induction
Matters change under certain refined equilibrium notions of subgame perfection, which
select a unique equilibrium from the set.  Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) introduced the concept of
‘forward induction’ with the aim of describing some desirable properties of an equilibrium
concept.  In general terms, forward induction says that the actions of players have strategic
significance, and should be interpreted in this light.  It can be described (Battigalli 1996) in the
following way: “A player should always try to interpret her information about the behavior of
her opponents assuming that they are not implementing ‘irrational’ strategies.”5  In our case the
forward-induction rationality requirements imposed by Bagwell and Ramey seem relatively
mild.  Players should avoid weakly-dominated strategies, and their opponents should be aware of
this, and take it into account when making their decisions.6
                                                           
5 Forward induction (as with other refined equilibrium concepts, like strategic stability) has, nevertheless, interesting
connections with bounded rationality.  For a rich discussion of the concept and formal definitions, see Hauk and
Hurkens (2002).
6 An alternative definition by Van Damme (1989, p. 485) states that when: “player i chooses between an outside
option or to play a game G of which a unique (viable) equilibrium *e yields this player more than the outside option,
only the outcome in which i chooses G and *e  is played is plausible.”  It is easy to see that this (stronger) notion
yields the same result in this game.
7Previous evidence on the predictive value of forward induction is rather mixed.  Cooper,
DeJong, Forsythe & Ross (1992) analyze experiments involving a choice between an outside
option for one of the players and a 2x2 coordination game, with two Pareto-ranked equilibria.
They only analyze the case where forward induction and a simple dominance argument lead to
the same prediction.  Their results are consistent with this kind of forward induction idea.
Cooper et al. (1993) present results from an experimental game, where there is an outside option
for one of the players and a symmetric Battle-of-the-Sexes game is played if this outside option
is foregone.  When forward induction coincides with simple dominance the results are again
consistent with these notions.  However, in a second treatment, an outside option that does not
dominate one of the other choices in the Battle-of-the-Sexes was observed to affect play in the
same manner as an outside option that does dominate.
Van Huyck et al. (1993) consider an experimental setting in which players participate in
an auction for the right to play a coordination game.  Their results exhibit two key features: The
price in the auction is high enough for a forward induction argument (different from dominance
here) to select the Pareto-efficient equilibrium, and subjects’ play in the coordination game
actually selects this equilibrium.  Schotter et al. (1994) study an experimental game for which the
application of iterated dominance selects one outcome and obtain results that are not consistent
with the predictions of the iterated dominance argument.  The results presented in Brandts and
Holt (1995) do not support forward induction, except in a very simple game where it is
equivalent to the elimination of dominated strategies.  Balkenborg (1998) reports results from a
game in which backward induction yields an outcome different from that resulting from forward
induction arguments; less than 20% of all cases result in the forward-induction outcome.
The focus in our paper is to consider forward induction in relation to a specific and
important issue in the area of industrial organization.  For this purpose, we have learnt from
previous work and use experimental procedures that should give forward induction its best shot.
We give subjects considerable experience and put them in both the incumbent’s and the entrant’s
role to help them envision the strategic relations between the two firms.
In our game, forward induction gives the second mover an advantage.  The argument
goes as follows: At the time of pre-commitment an entrant can guarantee himself a payoff of 0,
independently of what the incumbent has done, by not committing and then choosing NI.  Thus,
any strategy under which a player pre-commits and then chooses NI is weakly dominated, as it
8yields a lower payoff.  Knowing that player 2 does not play dominated strategies, when player 1
observes a pre-commitment by player 2, he must conclude – according to the forward induction
logic - that player 2 intends to become the monopolist and will play I, and so player 1 will
respond optimally with NI.
As a consequence, player 2 will always (optimally) pre-commit, and then play I.  In
contrast, pre-commitment does not have the same signaling value for the incumbent firm.  An
incumbent that pre-committed could, mistakenly, have believed that the entrant was not going to
pre-commit (thus, expecting to become the monopolist).  So, when faced with the unambiguous
subsequent pre-commitment choice of the entrant, the incumbent should yield and leave the
monopoly profits to the entrant.  An incumbent who has not pre-committed has an even stronger
reason to yield in front of a pre-committed entrant. In anticipation of all this, the incumbent does
not pre-commit and leaves the market to the entrant.
Therefore, by forward induction, only the outcome (NI, I) is plausible. Taking this into
account, the first player will optimally respond by not pre-committing and then choosing NI in
all the subgames.  So the set of strategies that survive the iterated deletion of weakly-dominated
strategies includes only the outcome (NI, I).
2.3. Iterated Deletion of Weakly-dominated Strategies.
In our experiments the game was played using the strategy-elicitation method.7  This
means that the incumbent had to choose whether to pre-install or not and also whether to
complete the investment or not for each of the entrant’s possible pre-installation decisions in the
second stage. Similarly, the entrant had to make a pre-installation decision for the incumbent’s
two possible pre-installation decisions, as well as a complete investment decision for the two
possible resulting pre-installation decisions of the two players.
The corresponding reduced normal form is shown in Table 1; it can be used to further
illustrate the selection rationale presented above.  Here the incumbent is the row player and the
entrant the column player. The labels of the strategies are now those used in the experiment,
where the number “1” represents the choice of not completing the investment, NI, and the
number “2” means completing it, I.  The reasoning we present holds for all positive values of a
                                                           
7 This method allows the experimenter to collect data at every decision node. It can be considered to favor somewhat
more thoughtful behavior and is, hence, quite appropriate in this context.
9and F.  However, for ease of exposition, we now also use the same parameter values and payoffs
as in the experiment: We chose a = 1/2 and F = 1.  We then transformed the payoffs by adding 1
to each payoff and then multiplying every payoff by 80.  Thus, if both players choose I, each
receives 0.  If only one player chooses I, he or she receives 160.  Choosing NI gives a payoff of
80 without pre-installation; however, pre-installing and then choosing NI gives a payoff of 40.
Table 1: The Bagwell-Ramey game in reduced normal form.
CE11 E12 CE21 CE22 CF11 CF12 CF21 CF22 DE11 DE12 DE21 DE22 DF11 DF12 DF21 DF22
A11 80,80 80,80 80,160 80,160 80,80 80,80 80,160 80,160 80,40 80,40 80,160 80,160 80,40 80,40 80,160 80,160
A12 80,80 80,80 80,160 80,160 80,80 80,80 80,160 80,160 160,40 160,40 0,0 0,0 160,40 160,40 0,0 0,0
A21 160,80 160,30 0,0 0,0 160,80 160,80 0,0 0,0 80,40 80,40 80,160 80,160 80,40 80,40 80,160 80,160
A22 160,80 160,80 0,0 0,0 160,80 160,80 0,0 0,0 160,40 160,40 0,0 0,0 160,40 160,40 0,0 0,0
B11 40,80 40,160 40,80 40,160 40,40 40,160 40,40 40,160 40,80 40,160 40,80 40,160 40,40 40,160 40,40 40,160
B12 40,80 40,160 40,80 40,160 160,40 0,0 160,40 0,0 40,80 40,160 40,80 40,160 160,40 0,0 160,40 0,0
B21 160,80 0,0 160,80 0,0 40,40 40,160 40,40 40,160 160,80 0,0 160,80 0,0 40,40 40,160 40,40 40,160
B22 160,80 0,0 160,80 0,0 160,40 0,0 160,40 0,0 160,80 0,0 160,80 0,0 160,40 0,0 160,40 0,0
In this Table, the first (second) number after the last letter indicates whether I or NI was
chosen if the other person did not (did) choose to pre-install.  So, for example, A12 means that
the incumbent did not pre-install, chose NI if the entrant did not pre-install and chose I if the
entrant did pre-install; DE21 means that the entrant pre-installed if the incumbent did not pre-
install, but did not pre-install if the incumbent did; in the third stage, the entrant chose I if the
incumbent did not pre-install and chose NI if the incumbent did pre-install.
First, notice that the incumbent has only one (strictly) dominated strategy: B11 (by A11).
This strategy consists of the incumbent pre-committing and then choosing NI in all the subgames
that can subsequently be reached.  The fact that it is dominated simply means that it does not
10
make sense for a player to pre-commit if he does not want to become the monopolist (and so
obtain the (I, NI) outcome at some point).  The entrant has one strictly-dominated strategy (DF11
by CE11), and several weakly-dominated strategies: CF11 (by CE11), CF21 (by CE21), DE11
(by CE11), DE12 (by CE12), DF12 (by CF12) and DF21 (by DE21).  All of these dominated
strategies correspond to instances where the entrant pre-commits in some (or all) of the cases
when he can do so, and then chooses NI in the subgame(s) that follow(s) pre-commitment.
Once the weakly-dominated strategies of the entrant have been eliminated, the incumbent
has some weakly-dominated strategies: A12 (by A11), A22 (by A21), B12 (by A11) and B22 (by
B21).  All of these strategies correspond to instances where the incumbent chooses I in a
subgame where the entrant has chosen to pre-commit.  That can only be optimal if the entrant
chose NI in that subgame.  However, such choices by the entrant are dominated, and have
already been eliminated.
The strategy DF22 for the entrant is now weakly dominant among the remaining
strategies.  This strategy corresponds to the entrant always pre-committing and then choosing I in
all subgames.  This is dominant because the (serially) undominated choice of the incumbent is to
play NI any time he ‘observes’ a pre-commitment by the entrant.  Finally, since DF22 is
dominant, incumbent strategy B21 is sub-optimal, and the only strategies that remain for the
incumbent are A11 and A21.  So the prediction is that the incumbent will not pre-commit, but
that the entrant will pre-commit and then become the monopolist.8
It is worth noticing that even without performing this last iteration (that is, with just two
rounds of deletion of dominated strategies), the entrant can guarantee his favorite outcome (NI,
I), as all the equilibria in the game that remains after two rounds of deletion produce that
outcome.  In some of those equilibria the entrant does not even have to pre-commit. A less
stringent and perhaps more robust prediction would, therefore, be that the entrant becomes the
monopolist with or without pre-installation.
                                                           
8 In general, the order of deletion of weakly dominated strategies might affect the final outcome of a given game.
Not so in ours. The reason is that the strategies that are dominated (thus, eliminated) in (our) second round do not
affect the relationship between those that are dominated and dominant in (our) first round. For example, after just
eliminating DE11, DE12, DF11 and DF12, we can eliminate A12 and A22.  Even after this deletion CF11, CF21
and DF21 are still weakly dominated by the same strategies we used.
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2.4. The Dixit Game.
In our Dixit games, only the incumbent could pre-install, leading to only the two
subgames shown in Figure 2:
Figure 2: Subgames in Dixit Sessions.
SUBGAME A
Entrant
NI I
NI 0, 0 0, 1
Incumbent
I 1, 0  -F, -F
SUBGAME B
Entrant
NI I
NI -aF, 0 0, 1
Incumbent
I 1, 0  -F, -F
The forward-induction argument now points to the incumbent’s pre-installation decision.
The incumbent, at the time of pre-commitment can guarantee himself a payoff of 0,
independently of what the entrant does, by not committing and then choosing NI.  As before, any
strategy under which a player pre-commits and then chooses NI is weakly-dominated, as it would
yield a lower payoff.  Knowing that the incumbent does not play dominated strategies, when the
entrant observes a pre-commitment by the incumbent, he must conclude that the incumbent will
play I, and so responds optimally with NI.  As a consequence, the incumbent will always
(optimally) pre-commit, and then play I.  Therefore, by forward induction, only the outcome (I,
NI) is plausible.  Taking this into account, the entrant will optimally respond by choosing NI in
the subgames.  So the set of strategies that survive the iterated deletion of weakly dominated
strategies produces only the outcome (I, NI).
The corresponding reduced normal form is shown in Table 2, where, in the strategy
labels, the letters A and B refer to pre-installation decisions and the numbers have the natural
12
interpretation.  We again chose a = 1/2 and F = 1, transforming the payoffs by adding 1 to each
payoff and then multiplying every payoff by 80.
Table 2: The Dixit game in reduced normal form.
11 12 21 22
A1 80,80 80,80 80,160 80,160
A2 160,80 160,80 0,0 0,0
B1 40,80 40,160 40,80 40,160
B2 160,80 0,0 160,80 0,0
Strategy B1, the incumbent pre-committing and then choosing NI, is strictly dominated
by strategy A1.  With B1 eliminated, the entrant has two weakly-dominated strategies: 12 (by
11), and 22 (by 21). Once these have been eliminated, incumbent strategies A1 and A2 are
weakly dominated by B2.  This strategy corresponds to the incumbent pre-committing and then
choosing I.  So the prediction is that the incumbent will pre-commit and keep the market.
2.5. Experimental Design.
We conducted our sessions at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona.  Recruiting was
accomplished via announcements posted in university buildings; participants included students in
economics, business, law, political science, and the humanities.  There were 12 (different) people
in each session; in fact there were two separate groups of six, although this was not mentioned.
This segmentation ensures two completely independent observations for each session.  A session
consisted of 25 periods in which people were matched and randomly re-matched in pairs, within
the six-person subgroups.  In addition, we alternated participants’ roles – if a person was a row
player (incumbent) in one period, he or she was a column player (entrant) in the next.  We felt
that this alternation scheme offered the best chance for people to understand the subtleties
involved.  The full instructions can be found in Appendix A.
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We conducted six B-R sessions using the first of the two games described in the previous
section.  Payoffs were re-normalized for experimental purposes, and are in pesetas (at the time,
$1 exchanged for approximately 180 pesetas).  People received their earnings over 25 periods,
plus a show-up fee of 500 pesetas.
As already mentioned, in the B-R sessions play proceeded as follows: Each incumbent
stated whether he wished to pre-commit, and also stated a choice (I or NI) for each of the two
cases regarding possible pre-commitment by the entrant.  Using the labels of the game above, the
incumbent had to choose between A and B, and to indicate his choice in the two possible
subgames that could result from the choice between A and B.  Each entrant made choices
without being informed of the paired incumbent’s choices and stated whether she wished to pre-
commit if the incumbent had pre-committed and also whether she wished to pre-commit if the
incumbent had not pre-committed.9  Given her own pre-commitment choices, she also stated a
choice (I or NI) for each of the two cases regarding possible pre-commitment by the incumbent.
She had to indicate her choice both for A and for B, as well as her choices for the two possible
resulting subgames. After the data for the period was collected and matched up, each participant
was informed of his or her payoff outcome for that period.
As a control we also conducted three Dixit sessions. As in the B-R sessions, we had 25
periods with random re-matching.  Here the incumbent stated his choice concerning pre-
commitment, as well as his choice (I or NI) in the resulting subgame.  The entrant stated a choice
(I or NI) if the incumbent had pre-committed and also if the incumbent had not pre-committed.
So, overall, we had nine sessions, with a total of 108 participants.  Average payoffs for the two-
hour sessions were around 2500 pesetas.
3. RESULTS
3.1. Realized Outcomes
We focus first on realized outcomes and move later to the consideration of strategy
choices to understand how outcomes eventuate.
                                                           
9 We shall henceforth presume that the incumbent is male and the entrant is female, despite the fact that one’s
gender must therefore change each period.
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Table 3 shows the distribution of realized outcomes among the different cells of the B-R
game, separately for each of the twelve groups, where we now indicate whether the different
subgames involve P(reinstallation) or N(o) P(reinstallation) by the two players10:
Table 3: Realized Outcomes in the B-R Sessions.
Subgame AC (NP,NP) Subgame AD (NP,P)
Group NI, NI NI, I I, NI I, I NI, NI NI, I I, NI I, I
1 13 13 13 10 0 5 1 5
2 10 5 20 10 1 6 0 3
3 3 3 22 14 0 14 1 6
4 5 1 7 5 1 2 0 3
5 9 8 29 22 0 0 1 2
6 6 3 22 18 0 3 1 7
7 8 3 41 7 0 1 1 5
8 13 2 49 10 0 0 1 0
9 8 5 11 6 2 13 1 7
10 5 0 31 8 1 1 1 8
11 6 12 11 17 0 5 1 3
12 5 9 5 5 2 8 1 9
91 64 261 132 7 58 10 58Aggregated
548   (60.9%) 133   (14.8%)
Subgame BE (P,NP) Subgame BF (P,P)
Group NI, NI NI, I I, NI I, I NI, NI NI, I I, NI I, I
1 0 0 6 8 0 1 0 0
2 2 0 11 4 1 1 1 0
3 2 0 6 4 0 0 0 0
4 1 0 43 4 0 0 2 1
5 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1
6 0 0 11 3 0 0 1 0
7 2 0 5 1 1 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 2 0 10 3 1 3 0 3
10 1 0 12 4 1 0 1 1
11 3 0 7 3 1 3 3 0
12 1 0 12 5 1 8 0 4
14 0 123 41 6 16 9 10Aggregated
178   (19.8%) 41   (4.6%)
                                                           
10 Recall that there were two completely independent six-person groups in each of our nine sessions.
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Market capture and pre-commitment. In our context the most fundamental question is,
arguably, which of the two players captures the market.  The answer represents the bottom line
with respect to the forward-induction prediction.  If the entrant were to mostly become the
monopolist, this would, carried over to a wider context, imply that the incumbent would
somehow have to share the market with the entrant.  We need to compare the sum of all (NI,I)
outcomes with that of all of the (I,NI) outcomes.  The result is that the entrant becomes the
monopolist only 15% of the time, instead of the predicted 100%.  By comparison, the incumbent
becomes the monopolist in 45% of the cases.  Coordination failure is substantial with no one in
the market 13% of the time and both players in the market 27% of the time.  Note, however, that
together this 40% is still below the rate of coordination on the incumbent becoming the
monopolist.
The natural next question is whether the incumbent’s preponderance is accomplished
through his pre-commitment.  Overall, the incumbent pre-installs somewhat more often (24%)
than does the entrant (19%).11  When there is no pre-installation, the incumbent becomes the
monopolist 48% of the time (the corresponding figure for the entrant is 12%).  When only the
incumbent pre-installs, he becomes the monopolist 69% of the time (the corresponding figure for
the entrant is 44%), so that pre-commitment does help the incumbent.  Taken together these facts
allow us to say that the incumbent wins the market frequently and rather effortlessly, more so
than the entrant, in contrast to what theory suggests.
It is clear from Table 1 that there is a high degree of variance in behavior across groups.
For example, the group 4 incumbents took over the market in 55 (of 75) cases and the group 4
entrants took over the market in 3 cases, while for group 12 these figures were 18 and 25,
respectively.  Pre-installation behavior also varied considerably by group.  For example,
group 4 incumbents pre-installed 51 times, while group 8 incumbents never pre-installed; group
12 entrants pre-installed 33 times, while group 5 entrants pre-installed five times (and group 8
entrants pre-installed only once).
                                                           
11 Incumbent pre-commitment results in subgames BE or BF (219 of 900 outcomes), while entrant pre-commitment
results in subgames AD or BF (174 of 900 outcomes).
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A high proportion of both entrants and incumbents chose to pre-install no more than 10%
of the time; however, there is considerable variation across the population.  Comparing rates for
each individual in B-R, 35 individuals (of 72) were more likely to pre-install as an entrant than as
an incumbent, while this was reversed for 30 individuals; there was no difference in pre-
installation rates for seven participants.  While few participants (19% of the incumbents and 3%
of the entrants) pre-installed more than half of the time in B-R, nearly 40% of the participants did
so (as the incumbent) in the Dixit sessions.
Comparisons across subgames. We now focus on different comparisons involving
observed frequencies in the different subgames, which we use to more clearly highlight the
degree of support for the general notion of pre-commitment as a tool for market control.  We
start by observing that the incumbent’s pre-installation decision has only a very minor impact on
the entrant’s pre-installation rate: The entrant chooses to pre-install 18.7% of the time when the
incumbent pre-installs, compared to19.5% of the time when the incumbent does not pre-install.
At this point one might be tempted to jump to the conclusion that the strategic principles
put forward in game-theoretic analysis have no effect, even in its most basic form.  Nevertheless,
pre-commitment by at least one firm occurs frequently enough in our data to warrant an
examination of how firms’ pre-commitment patterns and their relation to final investment (entry)
decisions affect subsequent choices.  We next compare decisions within and across subgames,
and find that players’ decisions on whether to compete in the market are quite sensitive to pre-
installation choices of themselves and their counterparts.
Table 4 shows the proportion of eventual entry (choices of I strategies) into the market
for each player, contingent on pre-installation decisions.  Focusing first on comparisons within
rows in the table, we observe the following pattern: When only one of the players pre-installs
that player completes the investment more frequently and, hence, can be thought of having an
advantage in capturing the market. When neither pre-installs the incumbent completes the
investment more frequently than the entrant; when both pre-install, the investment rate is
somewhat higher for the entrant.
                                                           
12 In these Figures, each category on the horizontal axis shows the highest percentage.  Thus, the first column means
that nearly 50% of incumbents pre-installed between 0 and 10% of the time, inclusive.  Rates for entrants are
aggregated across whether or not the incumbent chose to pre-install.
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Table 4: Market entry conditional on pre-installation (strategies).
Players pre-installing Incumbent’s investment % Entrant’s investment %
Incumbent only (BE) 92.1% 23.0%
Neither (AC) 71.7% 35.8%
Both (BF) 46.3% 63.4%
Only the entrant (AD) 51.1% 87.2%
Comparing the proportions along the columns, it is easy to see that a player is most likely
to invest when she alone has pre-installed and is much less likely to invest when only her
counterpart has pre-installed.  Investment rates are at intermediate levels when neither player
pre-installs or when both players pre-install.  Overall, aggregate choices of both first-mover and
second-mover (recall that all subjects are sometimes first-movers and sometimes second-movers)
were affected by pre-installation decisions.  However, since the frequency of entrant pre-
installation is low, this sensitivity to pre-installation choices may just not be enough to yield the
Bagwell-Ramey predictions.
First-mover advantage. Some of the regularities that we have just discussed suggest that
there is a perceived first-mover advantage in this game.  Observe the large difference in
investment rates (71.7% vs. 35.8%) when neither player pre-commits; in addition, note the
difference in these rates when only the other player has chosen to pre-install, 51.1% for the
incumbent compared to 23.0% for the entrant.  In both cases, the investment rate for incumbents
is more than double the investment rate for entrants.  Thus, while in the strategic analysis the
asymmetry of positions favors the entrant, in our data it appears to help the incumbent.  It does
seem that there is a contingent of people who (correctly) believe that the second mover has the
advantage; this perception may prevail in groups 1, 11, and 12, for example.13  However, for the
majority of players the pattern is as if the incumbent had a ‘natural’ first-mover advantage,
something not captured by the strategic analysis presented above.
                                                           
13 Note that the highest levels of ‘confusion’ are observed when only the second mover pre-installs, with an average
of 1.38 market participants.  By contrast, the norms seem tightest (# of participants closest to the cooperative rate of
1.00) when neither player pre-installs or when both players pre-install, with only 1.06 and 1.10 market participants,
respectively.
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This interpretation may be confronted with the data from the Dixit sessions, in which
both the strategic analysis and the notion of a first-mover advantage reinforce each other.  Table
5 shows the distribution of realized outcomes for these sessions:
Table 5: Realized Outcomes in the Dixit Sessions.
Game A (NP) Game B (P)
Group NI, NI NI, I I, NI I, I NI, NI NI, I I, NI I, I
1 3 4 22 12 1 0 27 6
2 4 0 48 5 0 0 14 4
3 7 13 1 5 0 0 47 2
4 5 5 12 8 0 0 44 1
5 7 6 28 10 3 3 15 3
6 9 3 36 8 2 0 15 2
35 31 147 48 6 3 162 18Aggregated
261   (58.0%) 189   (42.0%)
 Overall the incumbent and the entrant become the monopolists in 69% and 8% of the
cases.  Recall that here only the incumbent can pre-commit, by choosing subgame B; in this
subgame, the incumbent becomes the monopolist in 88% and the entrant in only 1% of the
instances.  Even without pre-installation, the entrant tends to yield to the incumbent, who
becomes the monopolist 54% of the time, compared to 10% for the entrant.  The orderings of
these percentages is qualitatively similar to those in the B-R sessions (with no entrant pre-
installation).  The relevant rates are here 69% and 0% when the incumbent pre-installs (BE in the
B-R sessions) and 48% and 12% when she doesn’t (AC).  The first mover chooses to pre-install
42% of the time (189/450), almost twice as often as in the B-R sessions.  The pattern of
conditional investment decisions is similar to that in the B-R sessions: when the incumbent does
not pre-install, incumbent and entrant complete the investment in 75% and 30% of the cases,
whereas with pre-installation these figures are 95% and 5%.
Statistical analysis. While we cite summary statistics for our data, we must be careful
when performing a statistical analysis.  Each observation of an interaction between an incumbent
and an entrant is far from independent, given the 25 observations for each participant and the
high degree of interaction within each group. However, since each group never interacts with any
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other, one clean and conservative statistical approach is to consider only group-level data when
performing non-parametric tests.
Table 6 provides Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for a variety of comparisons.  In all cases
the null hypothesis is the equality of the number of outcomes.  For all instances for which we
indicate a prediction in the table the alternative hypothesis is the one that corresponds to the
direction of that prediction. In these cases we use one-tailed tests to reflect these ex ante
hypotheses.  In the cases where we do not have a theoretical prediction, we use two-tailed tests:
Table 6: Non-parametric tests of Behavior across Subgames, by Group
B-R Sessions
Comparison of Rates Prediction Outcomes,
by Group
p-value
Across Roles
IALL vs. EALL E > I 11I – 1E 0.998
IAC vs. EAC - 9I – 2E 0.005*
IAD vs. EAD E > I 8E – 2I 0.005
IBE vs. EBE I > E 10I – 0E 0.001
IBF vs. EBF E > I 3E – 4I 0.437
PI vs. PE PE > PI 7I – 5E 0.765
Within Roles
IAC vs. IAD IAC > IAD 7AC – 5AD 0.170
IAC vs. IBE IBE > IAC 9BE – 2AC 0.003
IAC vs. IBF - 7AC – 3BF 0.348*
IAD vs. IBE IBE > IAD 10BE – 1AD 0.002
IAD vs. IBF IBF > IAD 5AD – 4BF 0.674
IBE vs. IBF IBE > IBF 7BE – 1BF 0.008
IAC+AD vs. IBE+BF IBE+BF > IAC+AD 10B – 1A 0.007
EAC vs. EAD EAD > EAC 11AD – 1AC 0.001
EAC vs. EBE EAC > EBE 8AC – 3BE 0.103
EAC vs. EBF - 5AC – 3BF 0.547*
EAD vs. EBE EAD > EBE 10AD – 1BE 0.001
EAD vs. EBF EAD > EBF 8AD – 2BF 0.010
EBE vs. EBF EBF > EBE 7BF – 3BE 0.138
EAC+AD vs. EBE+BF EAC+AD > EBE+BF 9A – 2B 0.009
*Two-tailed test
20
Dixit Sessions
Comparison of
Investment Rates
Prediction Outcomes,
by Group
p-value
Across Roles
IALL vs. EALL I > E 6I – 0E 0.016
IA vs. EA I > E 5I – 1E 0.047
IB vs. EB I > E 6I – 0E 0.016
Within Roles
IA vs. IB IA < IB 6B – 0A 0.016
EA vs. EB EA > EB 5A – 1B 0.078
     In this Table, I and E refer to the respective investment rates for the incumbent and
       the entrant, and P refers to pre-commitment rates.  Subscripts refer to subgames.
The comparison in the very first row, IALL vs. EALL, pertains to which of the two players
becomes the monopolist. The 11I-1E comparison means that the incumbent became the
monopolist more frequently (overall) than did the entrant in 11 of the 12 groups, providing very
little support for the alternative hypothesis.  For all other across-role comparisons we compare,
for each group, the number of times that the incumbent invested vs. the number of times the
entrant invested.  So, for example, the 9I-2E in the second row under Across Roles means that
the incumbent invested more frequently than did the entrant in 9 of 11 groups.
For within-role comparisons, we consider the incumbent and entrant investment rates for
each group.  So, for example, the 9BE-2AC in the second row under Within Roles means that the
incumbents invested more frequently in subgame BE than in subgame AC for nine of 11 groups.
While we have data for 12 groups, there are often ties and/or cases where investment rates in a
category cannot be calculated (a zero divisor), so the number of comparisons is frequently less
than 12.
The tests confirm most of the descriptive analysis presented above.  First, the group tests
confirm that the incumbent is significantly more likely to control the market in both the B-R and
the Dixit sessions.  While this is in accord with the theoretical predictions when only the
incumbent can pre-install, it is not consistent with the predictions when the entrant has the final
pre-installation decision.
Nevertheless, the group tests also confirm that investment rates are highly sensitive to
pre-installation decisions.  In the B-R game, while the incumbent is significantly more likely to
control the market when the entrant does not pre-install (subgames AC and BE), the entrant is
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significantly more likely to control the market when she pre-installs and the incumbent does not
(subgame AD); there does not appear to be a consensus when both pre-install.  Within-role
comparisons are particularly strong when they reflect a difference in the pre-installation decision
for that role, and no more than one party pre-installs, we see that IBE > IAC, IBE > IAD, EAC < EAD,
and EBE < EAD, all at easily significant levels.  People clearly understand why they themselves
have pre-installed.
However, the effects are not as strong for within-role comparisons that reflect whether or
not the other party has pre-installed.  Both the EBE vs. EAC and the IAC vs. IAD comparisons show
that there is some (not-quite-significant) tendency to respect the other firm’s pre-installation
choice.  The only significant within-role comparisons involving the BF subgame are the cases
where the role player has pre-installed (IBE vs. IBF and EAD vs. EBF), suggesting that a player who
understands the logic of pre-installation is more likely to be sensitive to the pre-installation
decisions of others.
The group tests also confirm that the incumbent is significantly more likely to invest after
she has pre-installed than after she has not pre-installed (p = 0.007), and that the entrant is
significantly less likely to invest after the incumbent pre-installs (p = 0.009).  However, there is
no significant difference in pre-commitment on a group basis.
In all six Dixit sessions, the incumbent invests more than the entrant when he has pre-
installed; without pre-installation, this still holds in five of the six sessions.  Similarly, the
incumbent invests more often in all sessions when he has pre-installed, while the entrant invests
less in five of the six sessions when the incumbent pre-installs.
3.2. Strategy Choices
Our results may look somewhat puzzling given the theoretical discussion in section 2.
After all, the solution via deletion of dominated strategies looks very sensible, given that only a
few rounds of elimination are necessary. One obvious explanation is that the rationality of
experimental subjects is lower than what is necessary for achieving the theoretical outcome.  But,
one may wonder just how irrational these agents are.  Up to now we have provided a rather
synthesized view of the results.  Since we elicit full strategies for each player, we can also
examine the frequency of play for each strategy.  The strategy choices as well as the
corresponding expected choice for each B-R session are shown in Table 7:
22
Table 7: Strategy Choices in B-R Sessions.
Complete 1st mover strategies
Session 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
A11 A12 A21 A22 B11 B12 B21 B22
1 42 7 41 25 1 1 11 22
2 22 2 18 45 3 0 4 56
3 20 7 26 78 0 1 3 15
4 21 6 33 81 2 0 5 2
5 22 13 29 44 1 3 16 22
6 33 13 26 27 0 5 26 20
Aggregate 160 48 173 300 7 10 65 137
Complete 2nd mover strategies
Session 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
CE11 CE12 CE21 CE22 CF11 CF12 CF21 CF22
1 53 9 19 32 2 2 1 4
2 66 3 16 20 1 0 2 0
3 63 13 21 31 1 2 2 1
4 106 12 9 13 2 0 0 0
5 59 4 16 5 2 12 3 6
6 33 6 29 10 1 4 11 8
Aggregate 380 47 110 111 9 20 19 19
Session 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
DE11 DE12 DE21 DE22 DF11 DF12 DF21 DF22
1 1 1 14 4 1 0 3 4
2 4 0 13 5 1 0 1 18
3 0 1 7 2 1 0 3 2
4 1 0 2 1 0 1 3 0
5 2 0 18 5 2 2 4 10
6 2 1 8 8 0 4 3 22
Aggregate 10 3 62 25 5 7 17 56
To obtain a more in-depth view of subjects’ behavior we need to look at the expected ex
post payoffs of complete strategy choices, as well as the frequency of these choices. Table 8
displays this information, where strategies have been ordered by the frequency of their choice.
Using the information in Tables 7 and 8 we can now discuss incumbents’ and entrants’ strategy
23
choices and afterwards move to an analysis of why the iterated elimination of dominated
strategies does not fully work in our experiment.
Table 8: Ex post Expected Earnings for each Strategy
Bagwell-Ramey Sessions
Incumbent Strategies Entrant Strategies
Strategy Frequency Exp. Earnings Strategy Frequency Exp. Earnings
A22 .333 85.5 CE11 .422 80.0
A21 .192 97.5 CE22 .123 40.0
A11 .178 80.0 CE21 .122 56.4
B22 .152 108.8 DE21 .069 78.7
B21 .072 100.3 DF22 .062 72.0
A12 .053 68.0 CE12 .052 63.6
B12 .011 40.0 DE22 .028 62.2
B11* .008 40.0 CF12 .022 73.3
CF22 .021 49.8
CF21* .021 46.7
DF21* .019 68.9
DE11* .011 49.7
CF11* .010 70.3
DF12* .008 43.1
DF11* .006 40.0
DE12* .003 33.3
*Indicates that a strategy is at least weakly dominated in the first round of iterations.
Incumbent strategies. Tables 7 and 8 reveal that the predicted strategies are not the most
frequently chosen ones and that neither the predicted ones nor the most frequent ones are the
most profitable ones.  Recall that the two incumbent strategies that should be played according to
forward induction are A11 and A21.  However, the most commonly-used incumbent strategy
(33.3%, by far the highest) is A22 (do not pre-install and always invest later).  Strategy B22 is
used roughly as often as the predicted ones.
A22 has an expected ex post payoff of 85.5, better than the safe payoff of 80 that is
available by not pre-installing and never investing (A11).  Choosing A22 could indicate that the
incumbent thinks that it is likely that the second player thinks that the first mover has the
advantage.  However, the first mover could increase own payoffs by either choosing A21, which
only differs from A22 in that the incumbent chooses not to complete the investment if he
observes pre-installation by the second player.  He would earn even more by just pre-installing
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and playing B21 or, even better, B22 (so certainly play I if the second player does not pre-
install).  Pre-installing really clears the way for the incumbent’s market dominance here.
A11 is chosen almost 18% of the time.  This strategy is supported in the B-R equilibrium.
A21 is like A11 except that it chooses I if player 2 does not pre-install.  It does better than the
more aggressive A22 strategy, as the expected payoff from playing I in AD is only 21.6,
compared to 80 for NI.  In fact, many people follow these incentives – A21 is played 19% of the
time, and does best of all the no-pre-installation strategies.
The most profitable strategy, B22, is chosen 137/900 or 15.2% of the time.  Perhaps its
frequency could increase over time.  The number of times it is chosen (grouped in ascending 5-
period intervals) is 20, 26, 27, 30, and 34, so that it is gradually growing in frequency; the 34
B22 choices in the last five periods represents close to 20% of all choices in the final five
periods.  B21 is like B22 except that it chooses NI if the second player pre-installs. It is chosen
65/900, or 7% of the times. It has a reasonable expected payoff, 100.3, and its frequency seems
‘stable’ over time, with aggregate choices being 15, 9, 13, 14, and 13.
A12, B11, and B12 are played with such low frequencies, combined 65/900 or 7%, that
one may view them as errors or experiments.  Perhaps reassuringly, the only directly-dominated
choice, B11, is the least used one.
Entrant strategies. The most common entrant strategy, used in 42.2% of the cases, is
CE11, which consists of never pre-installing, then always playing NI and, hence, staying out of
the market. It was chosen more than three times as frequently as any other strategy, and in fact
this strategy pays the best ex post against the observed aggregate first-mover strategy.  It is also
the completely safe strategy, with a guaranteed payoff of 80.  Looking at both players at the
same time, the most frequent strategy combination is the one where the incumbent does not pre-
commit and goes for the market regardless of the entrant’s behavior and where the entrant never
pre-installs and yields the market, regardless of what the incumbent does.
The next most common entrant strategies are CE21 and CE22 (110/900 or 12.2%,
111/900 or 12.3% respectively).  CE21 prescribes the following: Do not pre-install, choose I if
the first-mover does not pre-install, but choose NI if he does.  CE21 does not do well, getting an
expected payoff of 56.4, since only 208/900 of the incumbents who do not pre-install yield in
subgame AC.  This is even worse with CE22 (the same as CE21, except that it plays NI against a
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pre-committed incumbent), yielding 40.0.14  How do they do these strategies do  over time?  The
5-period frequencies for CE21 are 25, 16, 23, 22, and 24.  Regarding CE22 over time, the 5-
period frequencies are 31, 27, 18, 18, and 17.  There is no obvious trend in the first case, while
the latter appears to be a downward trend.
DF22 is the prediction under the iterated elimination of weakly-dominated strategies;
always pre-install and play NI in the subgames that follow.  This is optimal provided that the first
mover chooses NI in all subgames.  It happens very infrequently, 56/900 or 6.2% of the time.
This strategy has an ex post expected payoff of 72, given the observed distribution of first-mover
strategies
DE21 is the strategy where the second mover pre-installs if and only if the first mover
doesn’t.  It then chooses I, if the first mover does not install, and NI when the first mover pre-
installs.  This strategy is chosen 62/900 or 6.9%. It does almost as well as the completely safe
strategy of CE11, and becomes somewhat more popular over time – the 5-period frequencies are
5, 16, 10, 16, and 15. 
The strategies that start with CF represent a pre-installation as a second mover only if the
first mover has pre-installed. They collectively happen only 67/900 times or 7.4% of the time.
The strategies DE11, DE12, DE22, DF11, and DF12 account for a total of 50/900 or 5.6%.
None of these strategies are very profitable.
Why does the iterated elimination not work? Recall that the only dominated strategy
for player 1 is B11. For player 2, the strategies that are dominated in the first round are CF11,
CF21, DE11, DE12, DF11, DF12, and DF21.  None one of these are played very often.  The
highest frequency is 19/900; collectively this is 70/900, which is still quite low, particularly
when taking into consideration that they might have been used to test the response of player 1 to
different modes of pre-commitment.
 So one could argue that subjects do largely avoid weakly-dominated strategies.  But,
crucially for the lack of empirical success of the B-R predictions, the subsequent round of
deletion fares much more poorly in the data.  The first and the fourth most used strategies for
player 1 are A22 and B22 (frequencies 300/900 and 137/900), which are dominated if the first
                                                           
14 Note that CE22 is the strategy chosen by entrants who believe that the entrant has an advantage and should not
even have to pre-install to capture the market.  It is the complement to incumbent strategy A22, where the incumbent
is always aggressive but doesn’t pre-install, apparently perceiving a first-mover advantage.  CE22 was chosen 111
times, compared to 300 times for A22.
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round of deletion goes through.  So given that those strategies dominated in the first round are
used so rarely, how do these relatively common other strategies survive?  The answer is that the
strategies for player 2 that make this domination apparent are also quite infrequent.
To make this discussion more concrete, take as an example B22, which is dominated (in
the second round) by B21.  The payoffs of these two strategies of player 1 differ only against the
following strategies for player 2: CF11, CF12, CF21, CF22, DF11, DF12, DF21 and DF22.  B22
does worse than B21 when paired with CF12, CF22, DF12, and DF22, and does better when
paired with the other ones: CF11, CF21, DF11, and DF21.  But CF11, CF21, DF11, and DF21
are all weakly dominated, which is why B22 disappears under iterated deletion.  However, in
practice the frequencies of these eight strategies for player 2 are all quite small, so the payoffs of
both B22 and B21 are quite similar, even at the aggregate level, and given the individual
uncertainty are probably indistinguishable for most players.  Moreover, the frequency of CF12,
CF22, DF12, and DF22 must collectively be at least three times greater than that of CF11, CF21,
DF11, and DF21, in order for the expected payoff of B21 to even be larger than that of B22.
And this is not the case, so in fact the expected aggregate payoff of B22 is a bit better that that of
B21.  Again, this is all aggregated data; at the individual level, the difference must be difficult to
discern.
Something similar happens when looking at A22, which is dominated (in the second
round) by A21.  The only difference is that in this case, the aggregate payoff is somewhat higher
for A21.  But once again the differences are modest, so that at the individual level they are
swamped by the uncertainty.  So this can explain why strategies that are dominated in the second
round do not disappear.  After that the third round of deletion would not be optimal.
Hence, a pre-conception, like the notion of the first mover having an advantage can
completely stall the progress of iterated deletion.  But even if agents are (mildly) boundedly
rational, it may be possible for them to learn to avoid dominated strategies via the repeated
interaction.  In the next section we will show that this argument is misleading.
4. DYNAMICS AND SIMULATIONS
We mentioned earlier that it is now widely recognized that learning by boundedly
rational agents does not necessarily eliminate weakly dominated strategies.  As the intuitive
27
arguments suggest, under learning or evolution a strategy that does worse than another one will
tend to be observed less frequently.  But if the strategy against which the dominated strategy
does poorly is also decreasing over time (so that the advantage of the dominating one becomes
smaller as well), the decrease of the dominated strategy will be slower and slower, so that it can
stabilize at a positive level.
We will now show, first with a theoretical framework for deterministic dynamics, and
then through simulation under stochastic dynamics, that the equilibria with iteratively dominated
strategies can survive in the long run under learning in this game, and that models of learning can
track observed behavior in the lab reasonably well. The analytical and simulation results are
complementary. The analytical results with deterministic dynamics are rather general (within
their class) but only suggest a possibility, namely, that given the “right” initial conditions,
iteratively weakly dominated strategies may survive in the limit as time goes to infinity.15 The
simulations show that even in small populations, with a short time-horizon, particular stochastic
learning models have many of the features of our data, in particular that iteratively weakly
dominated strategies can survive for the duration of our experiment.
  Deterministic dynamics. We must first introduce some notation: Let isix  be the
probability assigned by the player i to strategy is .  Let iix DŒ be a mixed strategy for agent i,
where iD  is the simplex which describes player i’s mixed-strategy space.  We formalize the
behavior of each player in terms of the mixed strategy he adopts at each point in time, so the
vector ))(),(()( 21 txtxtx =  will describe the state of the system at time t,
16 defined over the
simplex  21 D¥D=D  of which 
0D is the relative interior.
Assumption d.1. The evolution of x(t) is given by a system of continuous-time differential
equations:
)).(()( txDtx ii si
s
i =
                                                           
15 Deterministic dynamics can (and perhaps should) be interpreted as limits of stochastic dynamics for large
populations (Cabrales 2000) or for slow adaptation (Börgers and Sarin 1997).
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We require that the autonomous system satisfies the standard regularity conditions; i.e. D must
be (i) Lipschitz continuous with (ii) .0))(( =S Œ txD
i
ii
s
iSs   Furthermore, D must also satisfy the
following requirements:
Assumption d.2.  D is a regular (payoff) monotonic selection dynamic.  More explicitly, let
)(/)())(,( txtxtxsg ii si
s
iii &≡ denote the growth rate of strategy is .  Then, for all is , 'is  and all
)(tx , it must be true that
[ ] [ ]))(,'())(,())(,'())(,( txsutxsusigntxsgtxsgsign iiiiiiii -=- .
Assumption d.2 merely says that a strategy that has a higher payoff, given the current state of the
population grows faster (decreases more slowly) than a strategy with a lower payoff.
Assumption d.3. 0)0( DŒx .
This assumption is a technical necessity because regular dynamics are such that a strategy with
zero initial weight will have zero weight at all subsequent times.  So a weakly-dominant strategy
will have no power against dominated ones, when the strategies of other players against which it
does well are never used.  This assumption guarantees that the survival of dominated strategies
does not arise simply due to an initial non-existence of those strategies.
We will now show that the elements in one of the subgame-perfect equilibrium
components which does not survive iterated deletion are limit points of the dynamics from some
interior solution.  To state the theorem we introduce more notation.  By Lipschitz continuity
there is a constant ,0>K  such that, for all  iii xxs -- ',,  we have that:
iiiiiiii xxKxsgxsg ---- -£- ')',(),(
where the 
† 
. denotes the norm of a vector. This in turn implies that when
 1),'(),( -<- -- iiiiii xsuxsu , there exists some h such that hxsgxsg iiiiii -£- -- )',(),( .
                                                                                                                                                                                             
16 As is common in the evolutionary literature ( x(t), y(t)) can also be interpreted as the proportions of people playing
each strategy when a game is repeatedly played by a randomly-matched large population.
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Proposition 1. Assume that
 
† 
2 K
h
1- x2
si (0)
x2
CE11(0)si œS2*
Â
Max
si ≠CE12*
x2
si (0)
x2
CE12(0) > 9
16
 and that 
† 
2 K
h
1- x1
si (0)
x1
A22 (0)
siœ A 21, A 22{ }
Â
MaxsiŒ A21, A22{ }x1
si (0)
x1
A22 (0) > 7
8
(a) For all 
† 
si œ CE11,CE12,CF11,CF12{ } , and for all t,
† 
x2
si (t) < exp(-ht ) x2
si (0)
x2
CE11(0)
(b) For all t, .
16
9
)(212 >tx
ZCES
(c) For all 
† 
i œ A21,A22{ } , and for all t,
† 
x1
si (t) < exp(-ht ) x1
si (0)
x1
A22(0)
(d) For all t, 
† 
x1
A22 (t ) > 7
8
.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Simulation results. We next present simulation results based on the Camerer and Ho (1999)
learning model.  Figures 3 and 4 show in parallel the observed and predicted frequencies of use
for the eight different incumbent strategies, while Figures 5 and 6 show observed and
frequencies of use for the 16 different entrant strategies.  The graphs show the average of 1000
simulation runs.17
                                                           
17 We chose the following parameter values: phi= 0.9 and lambda=1.2.
30
Figure 3: Observed Incumbent Strategies
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Figure 4: Simulated Incumbent Strategies
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Figure 5: Observed Entrant Strategies
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Figure 6: Simulated Entrant Strategies
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Observe how the simulation model correctly captures many of the main features of the
data.  In terms of the levels, of the four strategies (A11, A21, A22, B22) for the incumbent with
frequency above 10% in the data at round 25, three of them (A11, A21, A22) also have
frequency above 10% in the simulations.  The only strategy of the entrant (CE11) with frequency
above 10% in the data also has frequency above 10% in the simulations. In terms of the
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dynamics, notice, for example, that the general trends of A11 (moderately downwards) and A22
(slightly upwards) are well captured.  The simulations also capture the moderate upward trend
for the entrant’s strategy CE11.  We also wish to highlight that, consistent with the intuitive
argument presented above, B21 does not grow at the expense of B22.  Similarly A21 does not
grow at the expense of A22.
5. CONCLUSION
There is a puzzle in industrial organization: Despite the theoretical arguments advanced
for entry deterrence by incumbents, there is little empirical evidence that firms behave in this
manner.  Bagwell and Ramey (1996) propose an alternative model of the timing in the entry
game, providing a ‘last-mover advantage’ through the logic of forward induction.  It is suggested
that this is the reason that incumbent firms do not engage in entry deterrence.
We study behavior in a simplified version of the B-R model and compare it to
observations from the simpler Dixit game.  Our work is, hence, an experimental investigation of
a theoretical rationalization of field evidence.  We find that in both games the first mover tends
to capture the market.  This does not require a strong propensity towards pre-commitment by the
first mover in either case, although a strong minority of incumbents do engage in frequent pre-
installation in the Dixit game.  Nevertheless, pre-commitment by the incumbent helps
profitability.
In the B-R game, the strategy in which the incumbent does not pre-install, but
nevertheless enters the market regardless of the entrant’s pre-installation decision, is by far the
most common (chosen fully 1/3 of the time).  The logic of forward induction makes some
inroads against an a priori perception of a first-mover advantage, but generally must surrender to
it – the strategy leading to the highest expected payoff for an entrant in the B-R game involves
always staying out of the market.  On the other hand, forward induction and such a perception
work together in the Dixit game, and the incumbent enjoys an overwhelming advantage.
Just to posit the existence of a perceived first-mover advantage is not a sufficient
explanation of our data; one must also clarify why learning does not do away with this pre-
conception.  Our theoretical result with deterministic dynamics and our stochastic simulation
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model results provide a rationale for why the initial behavior does not change too much over
time.
Thus we feel that we have obtained a rather complete explanation of why forward
induction is only weakly supported in our data.  It is not simply based on the notion that people
have limitations in their depth of reasoning.  Rather, matters start with a pre-conception that
subsequent experience with the environment is unable to erase.
One may wonder about the origins of a perceived first-mover advantage.  Our result bears
relation to some recent experimental findings reported in Weber and Camerer (2002) and Muller
and Sadanand (2003).  These studies show that when simple two-person games that are
‘simultaneous’ in terms of information are played sequentially, the first mover tends to do better
than when both players make actual simultaneous choices.  Note that this cannot be explained
just by the fact that the temporal asymmetry in moves allows for better coordination and that
players use any available clue to facilitate coordination.  If this were the driving force, then a
second player advantage could arise just as well.  There appears to be something special about
moving first.
Huck and Müller (2000) report another instance of a first-mover advantage that
transcends game-theoretic prediction. They study experimentally the Bagwell (1995) result that
the commitment value of moving first is severely undermined if the observability of the earlier
move is even slightly in doubt and find that people do not ignore prior moves even with
imperfect observability.
Our environment is somewhat different since the second mover does observe (at least in
principle) the first mover’s choice.  However, perhaps there is something more general in the
psychology of reasoning about timing that favors earlier movers. Weber and Camerer (2002)
suggest that, consistent with some evidence from psychological experiments, players may be
better at reasoning backward, about events known to have already happened, than reasoning
forward.  Description of possible outcomes of previously-occurring events is often richer and
more complex than description of later-occurring events.  Weber and Camerer conjecture on p.29
that “the past is easier to ‘imagine’ than the future.”
What can we say about the excess capacity puzzle that brought us here?  While our
evidence does not support the B-R prediction, it suggests, perhaps paradoxically, that the B-R
environment may be the better one to study the matter at hand.  Both firms have an opportunity
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for capacity investment but neither uses it very much, resulting in a prevailing tendency of
market dominance by the incumbent.
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APPENDIX A - INSTRUCTIONS
Thank you for participating in this experiment. For your participation you will receive a positive amount of
money. This quantity will be determined by the way in which your decisions relate to those of the other players. You
will, in any case, receive 500 pesetas, that is in addition to the amount of money you make during the experiment.
In this experiment there will be 25 rounds. In each round you will be paired with a different person in the
room. You will not be informed about the identity of the person that you are paired with in any of the rounds, neither
during the experiment nor afterwards. Neither will anybody know that they are or have been paired with you at any
moment.
In each round there will be a Player 1 and a Player 2. The players determine which game is played in each
round. Whether you are Player 1 or Player 2 will be determined randomly in each round, so that you will be
almost for sure in each of the roles at some point in the session. Player 1 decides whehterh she chooses action A or
action B. Player 2 chooses action C or action D for the case where Player 1 has chosen A, and action E or action F
for the case where Player 1 has chosen B.
For the case in which Player 1 has chosen action A, and Player 2 has chosen C for the case in which 1 chooses A,
the relevant game is AC.
For the case in which Player 1 has chosen action A, and Player 2 has chosen D for the case in which 1 chooses A,
the relevant game is AD.
For the case in which Player 1 has chosen action B, and Player 2 has chosen E for the case in which 1 chooses B, the
relevant game is BE.
For the case in which Player 1 has chosen action B, and Player 2 has chosen F for the case in which 1 chooses B, the
relevant game is BF
All the payoffs you can see in the tables are in pesetas; the first of the two numbers that can be seen in  acell
corresponds to the payoff for Player 1 and the second number corresponds to the payoff for Player 2.
                                     GAME AC                                                                    GAME AD
           Player 2                    Player  2
    S1   S2      U1   U2
     R1   60,60 60,120    T1  60,30 60,120
  Playerr 1             Player 1
     R2  120,60                 0,0     T2 120,30    0,0
                                GAME BE                                                                         GAME BF
           Player 2                     Player 2
    Z1   Z2      Y1   Y2
     W1   30,60 30,120 X1 30,30 30,120
  Player 1             Player 1
     W2  120,60       0,0 X2 120,30    0,0
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APPENDIX B – PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 1: Suppose that (a) is the statement that stops being true the earliest, that it
does so for strategy  is and that the boundary time is t’.  Then it must be that:
† 
x2
si (t ') = exp(-ht ') x2
si (0)
x2
CE12(0)
.
Note that 
† 
u2 (si , x1) £ 4x1
A22
+16(1- x1
A22 ) £11/ 2 , and also that
 
† 
u2 (CE12, x1) ≥ 8(x1
A12
+ x1
A22 ) ≥ 7 , where the last inequality in both cases, holds because by (d)
and the assumption here for all t < t’, 
† 
x1
A22 (t ) ≥ 7 /8.
Thus, 
† 
u2 (si , x1(t)) -u2 (CE12,x1 (t)) < -1,  so by continuity and assumption d.2 there exists
)(ah such that 
† 
gi (si ,x1(t ))- gi(CE12, x1(t)) < -h for all t<t’.  Then, by integrating, we have that
† 
x2
si (t ' )
x2
CE 12(t' )
< exp(-ht' ) x2
si (0)
x2
CE 12(0)
, which implies
 
† 
x2
si (t ') < exp(-ht ') x2
si (0)
x2
CE12(0)
x2
CE12(t ' ) £ exp(-ht ') x2
si (0)
x2
CE12(0)
, a contradiction.
Suppose, then, that (b) is the statement that stops being true the earliest, that it does so for
strategy  is and that the boundary time is t’. Then it must be that: .16
9
)(212 =tx
ZCES   As before, we
will reach a contradiction, but before we will prove the following:
Claim: For all 
† 
si Œ CE11,CF11,CF12{ }
))()(1(2))(,())(,( 2221 111121 txtxKtxsgtxZCESg
TARTAR
iii ---≥- .
Proof of Claim: For all 
† 
si Œ CE11,CF11,CF12{ } , since 
† 
u2 (si , ˆ x1)) = u2 (CE12, ˆ x1 ),for all 1ˆx such
that 
† 
ˆ x 1
A21
+ ˆ x 1
A22
=1, we have that 
† 
gi (CE12, ˆ x1 (t )) = gi(si , ˆ x1(t)) . So, by  Lipschitz-continuity we
have that for all 1x
† 
gi (CE12,x1 (t ))- gi(CE12, ˆ x 1(t)) ≥ -2K x1(t) - ˆ x 1(t)
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)(ˆ)(2))(,())(ˆ,( 1111 txtxKtxsgtxsg iiii --≥-
But since 
† 
gi (CE12, ˆ x1 (t )) = gi(si , ˆ x1(t)) , adding the previous two inequalities yields the result. 
Now, by the claim, 
† 
gi (CE12,x1 (t ))- gi(si , x1(t)) ≥ -2K (1- x1
A12(t) - x1
A22 (t)) , but by
assumption, for all t<t’ 
† 
x1
si (t) < exp(-h(c)t)
x1
si (0)
x1
A22(0)
for all 
† 
si œ A21, A22{ }  so that
† 
gi (CE12,x1 (t ))- gi(si , x1(t)) ≥ -2K (exp(-h(c)t)
x1
si (0)
si œ A21,A 22{ }
Â
x1
A22 (0)
) .  Then by integration we have that
† 
x2
CE 12(t ')
x2
CE12(0)
x2
si (0)
x2
si (t ')
> 2 K
h(c)
x1
si (0)
si œ A21,A 22{ }
Â
x1
A22 (0)
≥ 2 K
h(c)
.  This implies that
† 
x2
CE 12(t ')
x2
CE12(0)
> 2 K
h(c)
x2
si (t ')
x2
si (0)
and by summing over all
† 
si Œ S2
*
≡ CES1Z1,CE12,CF11,CF12{ }  we have that:
† 
x2
CE 12(t ')
x2
CE12(0)
> 2 K
h
x2
si (t ')
si ŒS2
*
Â
Max
si Œ S2
* x2
si (0)
= 2 K
h
1- x2
si (t ')
si œS2
*
Â
x2
si (0)
≥ 2 K
h
1- x2
si (0)
x2
CE 12(0)si œS2*
Â
Max
si Œ S2
* x2
si (0)
where the last inequality is true by (a).  This yields a contradiction by the assumption about the
initial conditions.
Suppose that (c) is the statement that stops being true the earliest, that it does so for strategy
is and that the boundary time is t’.  Then it must be that:
† 
x1
si (t ') = exp(-h(c)t ')
x1
si (0)
x1
A22(0)
.
Note that 
† 
u1(si , x1) £16(1- x2
CF12 ) £ 7  and also that 
† 
u1(A22, x1) ≥16x2
CF12
≥ 9 , where the last
inequality in both cases, holds because by (d) and the assumption here for all t < t’,
† 
x1
CF 22(t ) ≥ 9/16.
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Thus, 
† 
u1(si , x2 (t)) -u1 (A22, x2 (t)) < -1,  so by continuity and assumption d.2 there exists )(ah such
that 
† 
gi (si ,x2(t ))- gi(A22, x2(t )) <-h(a) for all t<t’.  Then, by integrating, we have that
† 
x1
si (t ' )
x1
A22 (t ')
< exp(-ht' ) x1
si (0)
x1
A22 (0)
, which implies
 
† 
x1
si (t ') < exp(-ht ') x1
si (0)
x1
A22(0)
x1
A22(t ') £ exp(-ht ' ) x1
si (0)
x1
A22 (0)
, a contradiction.
Suppose, then, that (d) is the statement that stops being true the earliest, that it does so for
strategy is and that the boundary time is t’.  Then it must be that:
† 
x1
A22 (t ') = 9/16.   As before, we will reach a contradiction, but before we will prove the
following:
Claim: 
† 
gi (A22, x2 (t)) -gi(A21, x2 (t)) ≥ -2K 1- x2
si
si Œ S
*
2
Â (t )
Ê 
Ë 
Á 
ˆ 
¯ 
˜ .
Proof: Since  
† 
u1(A21, ˆ x2 )) = u2 (A22, ˆ x2 ), for all 2xˆ such that 1)(ˆ
2
*
2 =Â
Œ
tx
Ss
s
i
i , we have that
† 
gi (A22, ˆ x2 (t)) = gi(A21, ˆ x2 (t)) . So, by Lipschitz-continuity we have that for all 2x
† 
gi (A22, x2 (t)) -gi(A22, ˆ x 2 (t)) ≥ -2K x2(t )- ˆ x 2(t )
† 
gi (A21, ˆ x 2 (t)) -gi(A21, x2 (t)) ≥ -2K x2(t )- ˆ x 2(t )
But since 
† 
gi (A22, ˆ x2 (t)) = gi(A21, ˆ x2 (t)) , adding the previous two inequalities yields the result. 
Now, by the claim, 
† 
gi (A22, x2 (t)) -gi(A21, x2 (t)) ≥ -2K 1- x2
si
si Œ S
*
2
Â (t )
Ê 
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ˆ 
¯ 
˜ , but by
assumption, for all t<t’ 
† 
x2
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si (0)
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CE12(0)
for all *2Ssi œ  so that
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*
Â
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.  Then, by integration we have that
† 
x1
A22 (t ')
x1
A22 (0)
x1
A22 (0)
x1
A22(t' )
> 2 K
h
x2
si (0)
si œS2
*
Â
x2
CE 12(0)
≥ 2 K
h
. This implies that
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.   By adding up over all 
† 
si Œ A21, A22{ }  we have that
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Â
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= 2 K
h
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h
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si (0)
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Â
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,
where the last inequality is true by (c).  This yields a contradiction by the assumption about the
initial conditions.
Since this exhausts all cases the results follows.
